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Abstract 
 Microsoft’s Windows Operating System provides a logging service 
that collects, filters and stores event messages from the kernel and 
applications into log files (.evt and .evtx).  Volatility, the leading open 
source advanced memory forensic suite, currently allows users to extract 
these events from memory dumps of Windows XP and Windows 2003 
machines.   Currently there is no support for users to extract the event logs 
(.evtx) from Vista, Win7, Win8 or Win10 memory dumps, and Volatility 
users have to rely on outside software in order to do this.   This thesis 
discusses a newly developed evtxlogs.py plugin for Volatility, which allows 
users the same functionality with Vista, Win7, Win8 and Win10 that they 
had with Windows XP and Win 2003’s evtlogs.py plugin.  The plugin is 
based on existing mechanisms for parsing Windows Vista-format event 
logs, but adds fully integrated support for these logs to Volatility. 
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Chapter 1: Windows Event Logs 
1.1 What are they? 
Windows events logs are “special files that record significant events on 
your computer, such as when a user logs on to the computer or when a 
program encounters an error.  Whenever these types of events occur, 
Windows records the event in an event log” (Microsoft Corporation, 2014a). 
 
1.2 What is in them? 
Any event that Microsoft has deemed as “significant” enough to generate 
an alert or notification to a user is potentially written into one of the logs.  
These logs differ by the type of the events that they record (table 1.1).  The 
following are some examples of system and application events by severity 
level.  An information event indicates that a change in an application or 
component has occurred, such as an operation has completed 
successfully, a resource has been created, or a service has been started.   
A warning event indicates that an issue has occurred, such as low disk 
space or a lack of other resources, that can impact service and/or result in 
a more serious problem if action is not taken.   An error message indicates 
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that a problem has occurred, which might impact functionality, that is 
external to the application or component that triggered the event.  A critical 
event indicates that a failure has occurred from which the application or 
component that triggered the event cannot automatically recover.  These 
last two examples are possible events in the security log.  A success audit 
event indicates an audited security event that was completed successfully, 
such as a user being granted access by providing proper credentials or 
password.  A failure audit event indicates an audited security event that did 
not complete successfully, such as a user being denied access by not 
providing proper credentials or password.  Also included for each event are 
the computer name, user account, date and time, process ID, thread ID, 
processor ID, session ID, kernel time, user time and processor time.  All of 
this information can be used to diagnose behavior, performance and 
security issues.  As important as this information can be for an 
administrator user, it is equally important for forensic analysis. 
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Table 1             (Microsoft Corporation, 2014b) 
Property Name  Description  
Source The software that logged the event, which can be either a program name, such as "SQL Server", or 
a component of the system or of a large program, such as a driver name. For example, "Elnkii" 
indicates an EtherLink II driver. 
Event ID A number identifying the particular event type. The first line of the description usually contains the 
name of the event type. For example, 6005 is the ID of the event that occurs when the Event Log 
service is started. The first line of the description of such an event is "The Event log service was 
started." The Event ID and the Source can be used by product support representatives to 
troubleshoot system problems. 
Level A classification of the event severity. The following event severity levels can occur in the system and 
application logs: 
 
    •         Information. Indicates that a change in an application or component has occurred, such as 
an operation has successfully completed, a resource has been created, or a service started. 
 
 • Warning. Indicates that an issue has occurred that can impact service or result in a more 
serious problem if action is not taken. 
 
 • Error. Indicates that a problem has occurred, which might impact functionality that is 
external to the application or component that triggered the event.  
 
 • Critical. Indicates that a failure has occurred from which the application or component 
that triggered the event cannot automatically recover. 
 
The following event severity levels can occur in the security log:  
 
 • Success Audit . Indicates that the exercise of a user right has succeeded.  
 
 • Failure Audit. Indicates that the exercise of a user right has failed. 
 
User The name of the user on whose behalf the event occurred. This name is the client ID if the event was 
actually caused by a server process or the primary ID if impersonation is not taking place. Where 
applicable, a security log entry contains both the primary and impersonation IDs. Impersonation 
occurs when the server allows one process to take on the security attributes of another. 
Operational Code Contains a numeric value that identifies the activity or a point within an activity that the 
application was performing when it raised the event. For example, initialization or closing. 
Log  The name of the log where the event was recorded. 
Task Category Used to represent a subcomponent or activity of the event publisher. 
Keywords A set of categories or tags that can be used to filter or search for events. Examples include 
"Network", "Security", or "Resource not found.” 
Computer The name of the computer on which the event occurred. The computer name is typically the name 
of the local computer, but it might be the name of a computer that forwarded the event or it might 
be the name of the local computer before its name was changed. 
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Table 1             (Microsoft Corporation, 2014b) 
Property Name  Description  
Date and Time The date and time that the event was logged. 
Process ID The identification number for the process that generated the event. 
Thread ID The identification number for the thread that generated the event. 
Processor ID The identification number for the processor that processed the event. 
Session ID The identification number for the terminal server session in which the event occurred. 
Kernel Time The elapsed execution time for kernel-mode instructions, in CPU time units.  
User Time The elapsed execution time for user-mode instructions, in CPU time units. 
Processor Time The elapsed execution time for user-mode instructions, in CPU ticks. 
Correlation Id Identifies the activity in the process for which the event is involved. This identifier is used to specify 
simple relationships between events. 
Relative Correlation Id Identifies a related activity in a process for which the event is involved. 
 
 
 
These events are categorized into different types  Admin, Operational, 
Audit, Analytic and Debug.  By separating the events in such a way, it 
provides a way for certain user types to be able to focus on the stuff 
pertinent to there needs.  The following table (Table 2) shows these 
different types, what they include and which users would possibly find them 
useful. 
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Table 2                                         (Menn, 2008)       
Event Type Description  Used By 
Admin The Admin type will suffice for the majority of system administrators. These 
events are very high level and they often provide enough information to 
identify a problem and determine its solution. At the very least, Admin events 
should identify when an issue occurs or indicate when an application, a 
component, or the system as a whole is in or has recovered from an 
unhealthy state. Most Admin events are errors or warnings, and they are 
usually actionable. 
Administrators, 
support personnel, and 
Monitoring and 
analysis programs 
Operational Like Admin events, Operational events enable problem diagnosis. 
Operational events consist of more than just errors and warnings. They also 
inform users about normal operation of an application or OS component. 
The volume of these events is kept quite low so Operational events can be 
enabled without affecting system performance. The Operational events—
along with the Admin events—are used by support personnel, monitoring 
utilities, and some sophisticated administrators.  
Advanced 
administrators, 
support personnel, and 
monitoring and 
analysis programs 
Audit Audit events provide a historical record of any resource access or actions 
taken by the users. These events do not in themselves represent failure or 
success of the program, but indicate a failure or success of the action. Audit 
events can be completely disabled or selectively enabled with varying levels of 
granularity. Security auditing at the OS level is supported (the events can be 
found in the Security log of the Event Log). 
Advanced 
administrators, 
security auditors, and 
Forensics specialists 
Analytic Analytic events, which are not very different from Operational events, are 
logged during normal operation of applications and components. But the 
volume and detail of Analytic events is much greater than Operational events 
and therefore there is a potential of them having a negative effect on system 
performance. Thus, Analytic events are normally disabled. To make use of 
Analytic events, enable them before a diagnostic session and then disable 
them before examining the trace. 
Support personnel 
Monitoring and 
analysis programs 
Debug Debug events are also high-volume events that are normally disabled. They 
are used mainly by developers and are seldom viewed by IT professionals. 
Developers 
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Chapter 2: The Forensic Value of Windows Event Logs 
2.1 Why are they important? 
Windows events logs, in general, are very helpful in determining what has 
taken place on any given Windows machine.  However, these logs prove 
essential in the realm of digital forensics as they can provide a who, what, 
where, when, why and how.  All of this stored information can tell you what 
user account logged in or failed to log in, what machine was used, what 
time and duration the account and machine were used, what applications 
(malware, keyloggers) were installed and/or removed (e.g., in the case of 
intellectual property (IP) theft, etc.), if possible malware or viruses are 
responsible for undesirable behavior (false logins and crashes ), what type 
of hardware and when it was added (possibly temporarily) or removed, 
reasons for system crashes (possible vulnerability exploit attempts) and the 
times of said crashes, and the list goes on.  This is just a small percentage 
of why events logs have become increasingly valuable for digital forensics 
and memory analysis.   
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Chapter 3: Hasta La Vista, XP!  
3.1 Volatility 
Volatility is the leading open source advanced memory forensic suite.  It is 
heavily used and relied upon in the digital forensics and memory analysis 
communities.  The Volatility framework, having been written in Python, 
allows for cross platform usability.  The modular design (plugins) provides 
flexibility and allows for faster updates.  Also, this design helps prevent total 
loss of functionality when operating systems are changed or updated. 
Some plugins may be broken, but others won’t be, which will still allow for 
some level of functionality until appropriate changes to the framework can 
be made. 
 
3.2 Windows XP to Vista 
When Microsoft upgraded Windows XP to Vista, many things were 
changed which had everyone trying to figure out what would still work and 
what would need attention.  One thing that did change was the way in 
which Windows Vista dealt with event logs.  Some of the first things noticed 
were that these event logs were no longer stored in the 
C:\Windows\system32\config directory and the EVT file no longer 
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had the extension .evt.  Now it was time to figure out what things were 
changed  and how those changes affect event logging. 
 
The Windows Event Log service was redesigned because of scalability 
restrictions of the Event Log (which limited the total size of all logs to the 
amount of available memory) and event publishing performance restrictions 
(which limited the number of events that could be published on an active 
Domain Controller) that earlier versions of Windows had experienced.  By 
publishing events in an asynchronous manner, the event publishing 
application doesn’t have to wait for the logging service to store the event, 
which increases performance (Menn, 2008).   
 
With the completely new event logging service of Windows Vista, the first 
thing is to find how and where the new events logs are stored.  With very 
little publicly available information regarding the handling and storage of the 
event logs, Andreas Schuster dedicated many, many hours in order to 
understand the new system behavior of system event logging in Windows 
Vista and how they are stored.  Fortunately, Schuster was able to answer 
many of the questions that hindered forensic analysis of these logs. 
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First, the old .evt files were renamed to .evtx and stored in 
C:\Windows\System32\winevt\Logs.  Having located the files, it was 
determined that the logs were stored using a proprietary binary XML 
(Extensible Markup Language) format.  Using XML provides a more 
structured format then the previous .evt logs.  This new XML log format will 
provide more granularity and flexibility in output customization and queries.  
Templates can be designed, specific to each forensic case, in order to 
target desired information.  While this is an improvement, unfortunately 
there is always cost. XML can be very wasteful because of the high amount 
computational resources, CPU cycles and memory, which are necessary in 
order to parse this file format (Schuster, 2007).   
 
3.3 XML Structure 
Events in an event log are XML fragments that can be validated against the 
Event Schema. The XML fragment is divided into seven elements: 
<System>, <EventData>, <UserData>, <DebugData>, <BinaryEventData>, 
<ProcessingErrorData>, and <RenderingInfo>. All the elements are 
optional except for the <System> element. 
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The event depicted in Figure 1 contains a <System> element, and a 
<UserData> element. The <System> element defines information about the 
event, such as the event's level, the name of the event publisher that 
published the event, the time the event was published, the channel the 
event was published in, and the event identifier. The <UserData> element 
Figure 1 
 
Microsoft Corporation, 2014 
 
<Event xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event"> 
    <System> 
        <Provider Name="Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler"  
               Guid="{de7b24ea-73c8-4a09-985d-5bdadcfa9017}" /> 
        <EventID>310</EventID> 
        <Version>0</Version> 
        <Level>4</Level> 
        <Task>310</Task> 
        <Opcode>0</Opcode> 
        <Keywords>8000000000000000</Keywords> 
        <TimeCreated SystemTime="2006-02-28T21:51:44.754Z" /> 
        <EventRecordID>7664</EventRecordID> 
        <Correlation /> 
        <Execution ProcessID="1068" ThreadID="1496" /> 
        <Channel>Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler</Channel> 
        <Computer>MyComputerName</Computer> 
        <Security UserID="S-1-5-18" /> 
    </System> 
    <UserData> 
        <TaskEngineProcessStarted  
                xmlns:auto-ns2="http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events"  
                xmlns="http://manifests.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/windows/eventlog"> 
           <TaskEngineName>S-1-5-19:NT AUTHORITY\Local Service:Interactive:LUA</TaskEngineName> 
           <Command>taskeng.exe</Command> 
           <ProcessID>6120</ProcessID> 
           <ThreadID>5920</ThreadID> 
        </TaskEngineProcessStarted> 
    </UserData> 
</Event> 
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contains the reason the event was published. This information is defined 
through a custom event template (custom XML elements) defined by the 
event publisher. This particular event contains a 
<TaskEngineProcessStarted> element, which gives an event consumer 
information about the event. This event occurred because the Task 
Scheduler service raised an informational event when the taskeng.exe 
process was started. This is conveyed through the elements in the 
<UserData> element (Microsoft Corporation, 2014). 
 
3.4 Log File Structure 
File Header 
The log file consists of a file header and a chunk or chunks.  Chunks are 
blocks of space (memory or hard disk) where the log file records are 
stored.  The file header is 4096 bytes, but only 128 bytes are actually used.  
The reason for having the extra space preallocated is that some logs, such 
as Application, Security and System, tend to be used more often and will 
need this space to grow because as the new events are stored, more 
chunks will be needed to house them.  The file header is protected using a 
32-bit checksum.  Also, inside the file header is the string “ElfFile” (0x45, 
0x6C, 0x66, 0x46, 0x69, 0x6C, 0x65, 0x00). This is considered the magic 
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string and when it is paired with a version number of 3.1, is indicative of a 
Windows event log file (Figure 2).  The number assigned to the chunk that 
is currently being used will also be stored in the file header.  These chunk 
numbers are zero based and if the current chunk is not the last chunk, then 
the retention policy calls for the oldest records to be overwritten. 
 
      Figure 2   
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Chunks 
Every chunk will include a small header, a hash table of strings and XML 
templates, and a series of event records.  The chunk header is 128 bytes 
and is protected by a 32-bit check sum.   As with the file header, the chunk 
header has it’s own magic string “ElfChnk” (0x45, 0x6C, 0x66, 0x43, 0x68, 
0x6E, 0x6B, 0x00) (Figure 3).  This magic string will make it easy to 
identify individual chunks.  There are also pointers to the offset of the last 
record and to the offset of the next record.   
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 Figure 3 
 
 
      
 
 
Event Record 
The event record always starts off with the magic string “**00” (0x2A, 0x2A, 
0x00, 0x00) and is followed by the record size.  It also includes the number 
of the record, a timestamp and the binary XML stream, which is the logged 
information. 
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Figure 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4:  Finding .evtx in Memory 
Since each file header is exactly 4096 bytes in size (a page) and always 
starts with the magic string “ElfFile” and each chunk is 64KB, including the 
header which contains the magic string “ElfChnk” and each event record 
contains its individual size and the magic string “**00”, data carving can be 
very effective in discovering log data. By targeting these magic strings and 
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knowing their size, we are able to find and extract each log file as a whole 
or even each event record individually.  Because of the binary XML format, 
the use of templates makes it possible to retrieve files which weren’t closed 
properly and sometimes corrupted.  There are a few tools available that are 
capable of extracting or viewing evtx log files, but they require using 
different modules to do different things.  EVTXtract and python-evtx are 
tools written in Python and were created by Willi Ballenthin.  They were 
modeled after Andreas Schuster’s EvxtParser tool that was implemented in 
Perl. 
 
 
 
4.1 Volatility and evtx 
Since Volatility’s support for extracting Windows event log information was 
interrupted due to the new format and storage, users were forced to look to 
other tools in order to get the very important information stored in these log 
files, hindering the ease of use that Volatility users have become 
accustomed to.  Volatility is written in Python and is designed to be 
modular, by use of plugins. This allows functionality, at least partially, after 
an update to an operating system such as Windows.  Adding plugins 
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provides the ability to update and add to the functionality very easily.  
Simply, a user can just drop a plugin into Volatility and it will be able to do 
the task it was created to do. 
 
4.2 Evtxlogs.py 
While Volatility is still chugging along after the many Windows operating 
systems updates, there is a need to return the functionality for extracting 
Windows event log files to Windows Vista and beyond.  EVTXtract and 
python-evtx have already proved  to be extremely useful.  Having the 
commonality of being implemented in Python, consolidating and integrating 
all the necessary modules within EVTXtract and evtx-python into a single 
file that would be compatible with volatility, seemed like the logical choice.   
EVTXtract consists of many different Python scripts that are designed to be 
called in different sequences depending on the desired results.  Trying to 
automate the process required removing some of the redundancies that 
were present in many of the scripts.  This was due to the fact that, no 
matter the number or combinations of scripts used, it still had to be able to 
save the output on termination.  EVTXtract can recover and reconstruct 
fragments or partial log files from raw binary data, including unallocated 
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space and memory images (Ballenthin, 2014).  Unfortunately, due to 
dependencies, it is not a standalone tool. 
Since EVTXtract is dependent on python-evtx in order to execute, the 
inclusion of the modules from python-evtx are essential in creation of this 
plugin.  Python-evtx consists of four modules, BinaryParser.py, Evtx.py, 
Nodes.py and Views.py.  Python-evtx is a standalone package, also 
created by Willi Ballenthin, that parses Windows log files with the .evtx file 
extension.  It allows access to both the file and chunk headers, record 
templates and the event entries.  Because of the dependency above, very 
little modification is necessary for these two to interact within the same file 
space. 
After following the workflow of EVTXtract and following some 
recommendations from Ballenthin, 
https://github.com/williballenthin/EVTXtract, the next step was to add the 
necessary code Volatility requires for integration. 
“Volatility requires all plugins to conform to certain criteria and format.  This 
not only guarantees seamless performance, but also allows for stability and 
uniformity of its product.  The Base Class: “Plugins should inherit from the 
commands.command base class, or any other plugin that descends from it. 
A plugin (command object) by default features the following functions: 
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help, execute and calculate. 
The help function should return a short string describing the plugin, by 
default this returns the plugin class docstring, and generally will not require 
overriding. 
The execute function firsts calls the plugin's calculate function and then 
returns the results of calculate to an appropriate render function (based on 
the output command line parameter). Again, this function should in general 
not be overridden.” 
The calculate function should carry out the main operation against any 
memory images being analyzed. This function takes no arguments and 
returns a single "data" variable, which can be of any form as long as it is 
then successfully processed by the plugin's render_<type> functions.” 
(Volatility, Plugin Interface,2012).  
 
Using a terminal, typing the following commands, within the ~/volatility 
directory will execute the evtxlogs.py plugin. 
 
python vol.py -f ~/Desktop/memDumps/WIN-TTUMF6EI3O3-20140203-
123134\(Win7SP1x86\).raw --profile=Win7SP1x86 evtxlogs -D evtxoutput 
 
python - denotes Python is being used 
vol.py -  name of the executable file (launches Volatility) 
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-f  - filename of the image to open 
~/Desktop/memDumps/WIN-TTUMF6EI3O3-20140203-
123134\(Win7SP1x86\).raw - the path and actual image to open 
—profile=Win7SP1x86 - the matching image profile to use  
evtxlogs - the name of the plugin being used 
-D - the name of the directory for storing the evtx-output.txt 
evtxoutput - the actual name of the directory for storing the evtx-output.txt 
file  * this directory can be named whatever the user chooses, but must be 
created and located in the ~/volatility directory prior to execution*. 
 
The following code is the class EvtxLogs. 
 
class EvtxLogs(common.AbstractWindowsCommand): 
 
    """Extract Windows Event Logs (Vista/7/8/10 only)""" 
    def __init__(self, config, *args, **kwargs): 
        common.AbstractWindowsCommand.__init__(self, config, *args, **kwargs) 
 
        config.add_option('DUMP-DIR', short_option = 'D', default = None, 
                          cache_invalidator = False, 
                          help = 'Directory in which to dump log files’)  
        self.files_to_remove = []   
 
    @staticmethod 
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    def is_valid_profile(profile): 
        """This plugin is valid on Vista/7/8/10""" 
        return (profile.metadata.get('os', 'unknown') == 'windows' and 
                profile.metadata.get('major', 0) == 6) 
 
Inheriting from the commands.command base class gives access to 
Volatility and its default features including help, execute and calculate.  
This code adds the option to assign a directory ”Dump-Dir”, denoted by the 
‘D’.  It also adds the text, “Directory in which to dump log files”, explaining 
the usage of  the option -D.  This plugin is for the profiles of Windows Vista, 
7 and 8 (not tested on Windows 10, but it should work because the 
structure wasn’t changed), so there is a need to check that the profile being 
used is compatible with this address space.  The @staticmethod decorator 
for def is_valid_profile(profile): starts the check for the ensure 
the appropriate profile is currently being used.  
 
The calculate method below, will start retrieving all the data that is being 
generated from python-evtx and EVTXtract.  The chunks (possibly partial 
and/or corrupted) and their offsets will be found thanks to their magic 
strings and set size.  The format of the data tokens being processed will 
determine the template that is chosen to be populated.  
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 def calculate(self): 
        records = [] 
 
        image_path = (config.LOCATION).replace('file://', '') 
        image_path = image_path.replace('%28', '(') 
        image_path = image_path.replace('%29', ')') 
 
        with State("default") as state: 
            self.files_to_remove.append(os.path.realpath(state._filename)) 
            with Mmap(image_path) as buf: 
                num_chunks_found = self.find_evtx_chunks(state, buf) 
            print("# Found %d valid chunks." % num_chunks_found) 
 
        with State("default") as state: 
            with TemplateDatabase("default.db") as templates: 
                self.files_to_remove.append(os.path.realpath(templates._filename)) 
                with Mmap(image_path) as buf: 
                    num_templates_before = templates.get_number_of_templates() 
                    num_valid_records_before = len(state.get_valid_records()) 
                    self.extract_valid_evtx_records_and_templates(state, templates, buf) 
                    num_templates_after = templates.get_number_of_templates() 
                    num_valid_records_after = len(state.get_valid_records()) 
                    print("# Found %d new templates." % (num_templates_after -   
   num_templates_before)) 
                    print("# Found %d new valid records." % (num_valid_records_after -  
     num_valid_records_before)) 
 
        with State("default") as state: 
            ranges = [] 
            range_start = 0 
            for chunk_offset in state.get_valid_chunk_offsets(): 
                ranges.append((range_start, chunk_offset)) 
                range_start = chunk_offset + 0x10000 
            ranges.append((range_start, os.stat(image_path).st_size))  # from here to  
           end of file 
 
            with Mmap(image_path) as buf: 
                num_potential_records_before =        
          len(state.get_potential_record_offsets()) 
                for offset in self.find_lost_evtx_records(buf, ranges): 
                    state.add_potential_record_offset(offset) 
                num_potential_records_after = len(state.get_potential_record_offsets()) 
                print("# Found %d potential EVTX records." %      
  (num_potential_records_after -       
   num_potential_records_before)) 
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        with State("default") as state: 
            if len(state.get_valid_records()) == 0: 
                print ("# No valid records found.") 
 
            for event in state.get_valid_records(): 
                records.append(event["xml"]) 
 
        return records  
 
Once the data and template computations are complete, the render_text 
method will start creating a file, evtx-output.txt, to store into the 
predetermined directory (see below).  
 
def render_text(self, outfd, data): 
        name = 'evtx-output.txt' 
        fh = open(os.path.join(self._config.DUMP_DIR, name), 'wb') 
        for record in data: 
            fh.write(str(record)) 
        fh.close() 
        outfd.write('Parsed data sent to {0}\n’.format(name))  
 
         #Removes/deletes temporary files default and default.db created during 
        #the extraction process. Fixes bug caused by switching memory images. 
        #Also fixes the inflated number of return results when running the same 
        #image multiple times. 
        for f in self.files_to_remove: 
            os.remove(f)  
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The following from an actual evtx-output.txt file produced by the evtxlogs.py 
plugin on Windows 7. 
 
<Event xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event"><System><Provider 
Name="Microsoft-Windows-WindowsBackup" Guid="01979c6a-42fa-414c-b8aa-
eee2c8202018"></Provider> 
<EventID Qualifiers="">100</EventID> 
<Version>0</Version> 
<Level>4</Level> 
<Task>0</Task> 
<Opcode>0</Opcode> 
<Keywords>0x8000000000000000</Keywords> 
<TimeCreated SystemTime="2014-02-03 03:09:18.457090"></TimeCreated> 
<EventRecordID>1</EventRecordID> 
<Correlation ActivityID="" RelatedActivityID=""></Correlation> 
<Execution ProcessID="1696" ThreadID="2400"></Execution> 
<Channel>Microsoft-Windows-WindowsBackup/ActionCenter</Channel> 
<Computer>WIN-TTUMF6EI3O3</Computer> 
<Security UserID="S-1-5-19"></Security> 
</System> 
<EventData><Data Name="hc_stateid">1</Data> 
<Data Name="pwszTimeStamp"></Data> 
</EventData> 
</Event> 
<Event xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event"><System><Provider 
Name="ThinPrint AutoConnect"></Provider> 
<EventID Qualifiers="0">4001</EventID> 
<Level>4</Level> 
<Task>1</Task> 
<Keywords>0x0080000000000000</Keywords> 
<TimeCreated SystemTime="2014-02-03 08:45:36"></TimeCreated> 
<EventRecordID>1</EventRecordID> 
<Channel>ThinPrint Diagnostics</Channel> 
<Computer>WIN-TTUMF6EI3O3</Computer> 
<Security UserID=""></Security> 
</System> 
<EventData><Data>&lt;string&gt;8 printer(s) of session 1 were deleted.&lt;/string&gt; 
</Data> 
<Binary>OI2lkltLA0EMhc+zv2Kor1U61ar4JmoVvEKF+qrbrRd0C7pC8df7TfZlhS2TKkOGTCY5OblE9
VtnQwPuaPpUpR51qqWCTrRQoS+9Y6tUY7nE8qAZ7w9t6lA7v3D66hFT6g2pkcC7tzZiigmcbTtBN7r
A0uZ4C86YnyNiCj3rxbIV3AkhOjjlEPIcJlbBjL87KkgeFZZr9CbLEN+IJLxdB6P18PL8xnR1ad57juxtb2/
/j+ldSVwNx2Z2Q3fnu2Lzea+YU4H/Qp/I3PbnHsRJ52ZN8Wzm2mQYOdj9N0O+hnPQkn3OSblKvRqD
wFRH+A3QztDSrCtt6duQDxzc/4rs2fWKWT1ZrQFbtMh911Z3R67K+QMVBpng</Binary> 
</EventData> 
</Event> 
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The following is from an actual evtx-output.txt file produced by the 
evtxlogs.py plugin on Windows Vista. 
 
<Event xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event"><System><Provider 
Name="Microsoft-Windows-WindowsUpdateClient" Guid="{945a8954-c147-4acd-923f-
40c45405a658}"></Provider> 
<EventID Qualifiers="">39</EventID> 
<Version>0</Version> 
<Level>4</Level> 
<Task>1</Task> 
<Opcode>17</Opcode> 
<Keywords>0x4000000000000280</Keywords> 
<TimeCreated SystemTime="2006-05-26 20:43:46.327250"></TimeCreated> 
<EventRecordID>3</EventRecordID> 
<Correlation ActivityID="" RelatedActivityID=""></Correlation> 
<Execution ProcessID="856" ThreadID="428"></Execution> 
<Channel>Microsoft-Windows-WindowsUpdateClient/Operational</Channel> 
<Computer>26L2233C6-05</Computer> 
<Security UserID="S-1-5-18"></Security> 
</System> 
<EventData></EventData> 
</Event> 
<Event xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event"><System><Provider 
Name="Microsoft-Windows-WindowsUpdateClient" Guid="{945a8954-c147-4acd-923f-
40c45405a658}"></Provider> 
<EventID Qualifiers="">29</EventID> 
<Version>0</Version> 
<Level>3</Level> 
<Task>1</Task> 
<Opcode>17</Opcode> 
<Keywords>0x4000000000000001</Keywords> 
<TimeCreated SystemTime="2006-05-26 18:09:51.490128"></TimeCreated> 
<EventRecordID>4</EventRecordID> 
<Correlation ActivityID="" RelatedActivityID=""></Correlation> 
<Execution ProcessID="928" ThreadID="1780"></Execution> 
<Channel>Microsoft-Windows-WindowsUpdateClient/Operational</Channel> 
<Computer>Galactica</Computer> 
<Security UserID="S-1-5-18"></Security> 
</System> 
<EventData></EventData> 
</Event> 
 
 
Conclusion 
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Windows Vista and its predecessors were released many, many years ago.  
While Volatility has still been providing support for those operating systems 
since Windows XP, there has been a disruption in the framework for 
retrieving the event logs and the information that they hold.  Even though 
there are other ways to get this information, Volatility takes pride in being 
an all-in-one solution for memory analysis.  Restoring the functionality of 
retrieving the information residing in the Windows event logs in the more 
recent releases (Windows Vista, Windows 7 and Windows 8), will alleviate 
the burden of having to rely on software outside of the Volatility framework.  
By combining some existing open-source software, it is possible for 
Volatility to resume the retrieval of Windows event logs in Windows Vista 
through Windows 8. 
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